

# Ecdotica

**3**  
**(2006)**

**Alma Mater Studiorum. Università di Bologna**  
**Dipartimento di Italianistica**  
**Centro para la Edición**  
**de los Clásicos Españoles**

 **Carocci editore**

## INDICE

### Saggi

- NEIL HARRIS, Profilo di un incunabolo: le «Epistolae in cardinalatu editae» di Enea Silvio Piccolomini (Roma 1475) 7
- FEDERICO DELLA CORTE, “Usus scribendi”, “ratio typographica” e altri preliminari a un’edizione di Aretino 34
- CRISTINA URCHUEGUÍA, Tra poetica e fisica. Nota preliminare a Martens e Reuß 51
- GUNTER MARTENS, Sul compito critico dei filologi editoriali. Tesi per un concetto allargato della critica testuale 60
- ROLAND REUSS, Vicende del manoscritto, vicende della stampa. Appunti sulla “genesi del testo” 75
- DAVID C. GREETHAM, Philology Redux? 103

### Foro

- L’autore in tipografia 129
- NEIL HARRIS, Come riconoscere un “cancellans” e viver felici, p. 130 • SONIA GARZA MERINO, El “original” de imprenta. El diseño del libro impreso antiguo según su autor, p. 153 • PAOLA ITALIA, Le “penultime volontà dell’autore”. Considerazioni sulle edizioni d’autore del Novecento, p. 174

### Testi

- JEREMY LAWRENCE, Stoppard, Housman and the mission of textual criticism 187

## PHILOLOGY REDUX?

DAVID C. GREETHAM

In a generous and comprehensive account of my *Theories of the Text* (Oxford, 1999) in *Ecdotica*, 2 (2005, pp. 80-98, «These post-philological days...»), Paul Eggert offers the reader a perceptive, articulate, and provocative account of the organisation, rhetorical method, and critical substance of the work. Normally, any author would be so gratified by such a knowledgeable and lucid account of his or her writing, that no further comment would be called for; and I am inevitably very grateful that Eggert obviously «comprehends» so much of *Theories*, sometimes bringing such a clarity of analysis to the book that I myself feel that I now know the book better than when I wrote it. And yet... Eggert quite properly makes much of the timing of the publication, in the last year of the 1990s: «It is clear to me that the project that this work embodies... ought to be seen as an expression of the 1990s from which we must move on» (Eggert, p. 82). But, as is a commonplace in academic publishing (and as Eggert fully understands), with substantial production delays the great bulk of the book had been written as much as a decade or so earlier, and given that Eggert's own review had first appeared in *TEXT*, 13 (2003) and that he then offers a «Postscript» written in 2005 for the *Ecdotica* publication, it is clear that the question of cultural chronology and the timing and reception of a work is a complex and inevitably *belated* critical question.

Eggert's own view of this ongoing chronology is that «the moment of

DAVID GREETHAM è *Distinguished Professor* nel City University of New York Graduate Center. Ha fondato l'interdisciplinare Society for Textual Scholarship nel 1979 ed è stato co-direttore della sua rivista *TEXT*. Le sue pubblicazioni includono *Theories of the Text* (1999), *Margins of the Text* (1997), *Textual Transgressions* (1997), *Scholarly Editing* (1995), and *Textual Scholarship* (1992, 1994). Ha pubblicato studi ad ampio raggio su argomenti antichi e moderni, e attualmente sta lavorando ad un libro intitolato *The Pleasures of Contamination*.

editorial theory (as we learned to call it in the 1980s) is over» (p. 82) and that a «marriage of bibliographically inspired editorial theory with book history would surely be one made in heaven» («Postscript», p. 97), citing as evidence the enormous success of the Society for the History of Authorship, Reading and Publishing (SHARP, at <http://www.sharpweb.org/index.html>), its publication *Book History* (at <http://www.sharpweb.org/bookhist.html>), together with a recognition that disciplinary change is constant, as evident in such examples as the journals *Bulletin of The Bibliographical Society of Australia and New Zealand* (BSANZ, at <http://www.csu.edu.au/community/BSANZ/>) and *Text*, published by the Society for Textual Scholarship (at <http://www.textual.org/>) trying to catch up with recent swerves by renaming themselves *Script and Print* and *Textual Cultures: Texts, Contexts, Interpretation* respectively. This shift of nomenclature and its representation of comparatively recent scholarly changes in research and intellectual concentration sound like very plausible reconfigurations of the academic territory, as is the forthcoming *Blackwell Companion to the History of Books*, edited by Jonathan Rose and Simon Eliot (both involved in the foundation of SHARP and *Book History*). One irony, however, might be that I have written the article on «What Is Textual Scholarship?» for this volume, and another that, if all goes according to plan, there will also be a *Cambridge Companion to Textual Scholarship*, edited by Neil Fraistat and Julia Flanders<sup>1</sup>. Thus, even within the changing landscape, some of the «old» concepts – like «textual scholarship», the rationale for the Society for Textual Scholarship and its publication(s) – have not yet given up the ghost, and there are no signs that such august and longstanding journals as the *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America* (see <http://www.bibsocamer.org/>) or the *Library* (the publication of the Bibliographical Society, United Kingdom, <http://www.bibsoc.org.uk/>) or *Studies in bibliography* (<http://etext.virginia.edu/bsuva/sb/>) are about to capitulate to the new modes by changing either their names or their focus on “hard” bibliography (of the type initially practised by BSANZ)<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, the existence

<sup>1</sup> *Cambridge Companion to Textual Scholarship*, ed. by Neil Fraistat, Julia Flanders, in preparation. I am contributing an essay on «Textuality and New Media Ecologies, 1600-2000».

<sup>2</sup> Similarly, it appears very unlikely that such «bibliographical» journals as the Canadian (<http://www.library.utoronto.ca/bsc/>), Oxford (<http://www.oxbibsoc.org.uk/>), Edinburgh (<http://www.edbibsoc.lib.ed.ac.uk/>), Cambridge (<http://www.lib.cam.ac.uk/cambibsoc/>) societies for the «old» bibliography are about to change, or that more specialised journals, for example, the Association for Documentary Editing (<http://etext.virginia.edu/ade/>), (primarily concerned with the editing of American historical docu-

of *Ecdotica* itself, with a *Comitato scientifico* that can be seen as very much a case of «rounding up the usual suspects» (Roger Chartier, Umberto Eco, Conor Fahy, Hans Walter Gabler, Lotte Hellinga, Bodo Plachta, among other luminaries), testifies to more of a continuum of the sort of wide-reaching but textually/editorially focused materials that characterised such journals as *Text*. The main contents of *Ecdotica* similarly represent this combination of large purview (in terms of subject matter) and carefully focused argument, with essays by Luciano Formisano, «Gaston Paris e i “nouveaux philologues”», Francisco Rico’s «“Lectio fertilior”: tra la critica testuale e l’ecdótica», Pasquale Stoppelli’s «Dentro la LIZ, ovvero l’edizione di mille testi», and Peter Shillingsburg’s «Verso una teoria degli atti di scrittura». Similarly, while the *Foro* on «Le collane di classici» does give some «book history» (and I would cite in particular Hugues Pradier on «La “Bibliothèque de la Pléiade”» and Joseph Thomas on the «Library of America» as brief but very informative accounts of the two «national» collections of literature), this is not «book history» in quite the sense meant by SHARP (or, I suspect, Paul Eggert). Both «theory» and «editing» are very much alive in the pages of *Ecdotica*, as its very title might suggest<sup>3</sup>.

Moreover, the very recent appearance of *Ecdotica* has a German-language precursor in *editio* (now edited by Bodo Plachta, who not coincidentally sits on the editorial board of *Ecdotica*). Indeed, the full title of *Editio, Internationales Jahrbuch für Editions-wissenschaft* (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für germanistische Edition und der Arbeitsgemeinschaft philosophischer Editionen), makes this (inter)national and «editorial» identity still clearer. The «virtual conference» on textual scholarship being held (if that is quite the right word) in Lisbon in 2007, and the establishment of the Centre for Textual Scholarship at De Montfort Univer-

sities), or the Renaissance English Text Society (<http://www.asu.edu/clas/acmrs/publications/mrts/crets.html>), or the Early English Text Society (<http://www.eets.org.uk/>), (the series of editions of medieval texts that was begun to provide the documentary raw materials for the *Oxford English Dictionary*) are about to change their basic editorial or textual principles.

<sup>3</sup> In the «Presentazione del Primo Numero» appended to the 2005 volume of *Ecdotica*, Gian Mario Anselmi, Emilio Pasquini and Francisco Rico trace the history of *ecdótica* to the period of Dom Quentin, as virtually synonymous with *critica testuale* – as distinct from, but related to, the more recent *textual scholarship* (p. 251) – and then cite a dictionary definition of *ecdótica* as «la disciplina que estudia los medios y los fines de la edición de textos» (p. 253). For some further reflections on current Anglo-American usage, see my «What is Textual Scholarship?», in *Blackwell Companion to the History of Books*, ed. by Jonathan Rose, Simon Eliot, Oxford, Blackwell, 2007, which takes in a somewhat wider view of *textual scholarship* than just «edición de textos».

sity in England (<http://www.cts.dmu.ac.uk/>) (with another «usual suspect», Peter Shillingsburg, as its first director), a similar Institute for Textual Scholarship and Electronic Editing at the University of Birmingham (<http://www.itsee.bham.ac.uk/>), with D. C. Parker and Peter Robinson as directors, the creation of a graduate program in textual studies at the University of Washington, Seattle (<http://depts.washington.edu/texts/program.htm>), the Editorial Institute at Boston University (<http://www.bu.edu/editinst/>), together with the increasing success of the offshoot of srs, the European Society for Textual Scholarship (<http://www.textualscholarship.org/ests/>) and its publication, *Variants*, are just further testimony to the fact that the obituaries for textual scholarship and editing are at least premature, and that an alliance, matrimonial or otherwise, with «history of the book» is not the only way to rescue the discipline, though I should emphasise that, as the «History of the Text» chapter of my *Theories* demonstrates, I do regard book history, *l'histoire du livre*, or new historicism as valuable, if not vital, components in the broad configuration of textuality.

At the same time, it would be foolish not to recognise that (at least in Anglo-American academia), the fortunes of textuality and editing have shifted in the last few decades. Old-style philologists may look back longingly at the time when the completion of a textual edition was regarded as the *sine qua non* of a doctoral education in literature, whereas now very few completed dissertations are solely or primarily in this form. I can testify to this from my own training, when (in the early 1970s) a straightforward scholarly edition of Trevisa's Middle English translation of Bartholomaeus Anglicus' *De Proprietatibus Rerum*<sup>4</sup> was not institutionally acceptable as fulfilling the requirements for the Ph.D., and I was advised that I should surround or contextualise the edition of Book XV of this work (*Liber Quintus Decimus tractat de regionibus et prouinciis*) with a cultural-historical study of the geographic imagination in the classical and medieval periods. One might argue that such a «contextualising» of an edition is, in any case, a necessary part of the editor's responsibility and that, as textuists as diverse as G. Thomas Tanselle and Jerome J. McGann have insisted<sup>5</sup>, editing is not simply a mechanical or

<sup>4</sup> *On the Properties of Things. John Trevisa's Translation of Bartholomaeus Anglicus De Proprietatibus Rerum*, Gen. Ed. M. C. Seymour, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, 2 vols.

<sup>5</sup> For McGann, see especially «The Monks and the Giants: Textual and Bibliographical Studies and the Interpretation of Literary Works», in *Textual Criticism and Literary Interpretation*, ed. by Jerome J. McGann, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985 and «The Textual Condition», *TEXT*, 4 (1988), pp. 29-38, repr. *The Textual Condition*, Prince-

technological exercise and of necessity involves a fully developed critical awareness of the cultural ambience out of which the text emerged (with McGann also maintaining that the post-publication of the work, whether or not sanctioned by the author, is just as potentially valid textually as the «originary» moment of composition). Indeed, I believe that most practising editors would take for granted that the sort of «contextualising» mandated for my dissertation would appear under various guises in the full edition itself, as historical/cultural introduction, as textual and explanatory notes, as commentary, glossary, index, and all the other parts of what Kathryn Sutherland has identified as the «search engines and tools for navigation that the print edition has developed»<sup>6</sup>, that is, the powerful codes through which a scholarly edition is read.

But editing as such has nonetheless been replaced from its former privileged position in the academic hierarchy. I believe I was fortunate that, in my very first doctoral seminar, the poet and critic John Hollander required as a first assignment that we all produce an 'edition' of a seventeenth-century poem selected from a sheaf of manuscript facsimiles that Hollander distributed. Thus, while no textual critic or editor himself<sup>7</sup>, he recognised that we could not begin the critique of a seventeenth-century poetic until we had at least been confronted with, and wrestled with, the bibliographical artefacts in which this poetic was housed. But I would doubt that such textual acuity is widespread in the academic

ton, Princeton University Press, 1991, among other works. For Tanselle, see especially *A Rationale of Textual Criticism*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989.

<sup>6</sup> «[t]he codex [...] has been the dominant means, our most powerful tool, for developing, storing, and distributing textual information. Over centuries, it has evolved specialized protocols and formulas, search engines and tools for navigation (contents pages, glossaries, indices, footnotes, critical apparatus of various kinds), all designed to organize, retrieve, and discriminate between the complexly related or distinct kinds of information held within text». «Looking and Knowing: Textual Encounters of a Postponed Kind», *Beyond the Book: Theory, Culture, and the Politics of Cyberspace*, ed. by Warren Chernaik, Marilyn Deegan and Andrew Gibson, Oxford, Office for Humanities Communication, 1996, p. 12, cited in Greetham, «Against Millennialism: First and Last Words from the Cross», *TEXT*, 16 (for 2004), pp. 1-32.

<sup>7</sup> But see his edition for the Library of America of the two-volume *American Poetry: The Nineteenth Century*, New York, Literary Classics of the United States, 1993, for which he favours as copytext «the earliest book edition prepared with the author's participation», although «revised editions are sometimes followed, in light of the degree of authorial supervision and the stage of the writer's career at which the revisions were made» (1, p. 945), two qualifications that provide a good deal of editorial license. See also his *Poems of Our Moment: Contemporary Poets of the English Language*, New York, Pegasus, 1968.

community; in fact, as I have previously noted<sup>8</sup>, all too frequently our «non-textual» colleagues may not bother to specify a particular edition for classes, but will work from the assumption that «any text will do». The question of course is *what* exactly will it do?

Another anecdote will illustrate the academic problem in a very practical way. The initial rationale for my edited collection of essays, *The Margins of the Text* (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1997) came from a panel I assembled for a conference of the Modern Language Association of America, during which it came out that, at one of the institutions represented by the panelists, a textual edition, a bibliography, or any other manifestation of «textuality», such a publication was regarded as just one *half* of a «real» book (presumably of criticism) in decisions on promotion, tenure, and so on. There could hardly be a more telling or more pernicious example of how our fortunes had slipped: we had to produce *twice* as many publications as our «critical» colleagues to get the same recognition. Furthermore, the demise of such «bibliographical» journals as *Analytical and Enumerative Bibliography* and *Proof* (coupled with the shift of focus in the retitling of *Text* as *Textual Cultures*) shows the change of fortunes in terms of reception, and presumably institutional support, with the obvious *caveat* that a substantial number of academic journals – in any field – do fold.

I would therefore offer a slightly different *Weltanschauung* for ‘text’ and «editing» than that proposed by Eggert. It is not (solely) by an alliance with the upstart history of the book alone that the old philology can be saved, but by a recognition that, like all scholarly disciplines, textual scholarship will partake of (and in part help to create) the intellectual complex in which certain types of question tend to be thought of, and therefore asked, as the climate of critical *possibilities* gradually shifts. What is thinkable at certain moments?

This question is, of course, a metaquestion, as well as an epistemological one. Certain types of «knowledge» can only be recognised as such, and thus investigated, when we have acknowledged the existence of what

<sup>8</sup> See my «A Suspicion of Texts», *Thesis*, 2, No. 1 (1987), pp. 18-25 (repr. *Textual Transgressions: Essays toward the Construction of a Biobibliography*, New York, Garland, 1997), and Peter Shillingsburg’s comment: «if any text will indeed do, then perhaps we should admit that the object of textual criticism is useless and abandon the whole enterprise», in «Text as Matter, Concept, and Action», *Studies in bibliography*, 44 (1991), pp. 31-82, at p. 83, repr. *Resisting Texts: Authority and Submission in Construction of Meaning*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1997, a counsel of despair that I address in the reprint of «Suspicion» and elsewhere.

Stanley Fish has called an «interpretive community»<sup>9</sup>, an issue I raise in *Theories* via Barbara Herrnstein Smith's concept of «contingencies of value»<sup>10</sup>, especially as it applies to the current «social textual criticism» (or, for that matter, to the academic and intellectual «value» that Eggert correctly ascribes to the currency of «history of the book»). I posit this problem, for Smith and any other critic offering a characterisation of this «currency», as «a failure to understand this very contingency of contingency, or socialization of socialization» (*Theories*, p. 374). I claim that

[i]n charting the historical move from the absolutism of value in a self-evident canon to the contingent and historically variable and local canonicity of the multiple canons of today, Smith acts with the very epistemological absolutism she condemns in exclusivist supporters of the universal canon, for she fails to acknowledge that her ability to make contingency into either a law or even a probability is itself contingent upon the historical moment in which such a truth-claim can be made. Similarly, the paradox of the social textual critics is that arguments valorizing the socialization of text are themselves dependent on the socialization of an epistemology that sustains such contingency over the absolutism of eclecticism (pp. 374-5).

Now, I recognise that for some practitioners (and perhaps some readers), this contingency of contingency argument might seem like another counsel of despair: if we cannot with confidence posit some form of grounding or fundamentalism that is fixed and immutable, by what measure can we ascertain that the *practice* of our criticism, textual or otherwise, is of any permanent *value*<sup>11</sup> (to borrow Smith's term)?

<sup>9</sup> Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities*, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 1980.

<sup>10</sup> Barbara Herrnstein Smith, «Contingencies of Value», in *Canons*, ed. by Robert von Hallberg, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984.

<sup>11</sup> Claire Badaracco briefly addresses this issue of «value» and editing in «The Editor and the Question of Value: Proposal», *TEXT*, 1 (1984), pp. 41-3, in which her own sense of «contingency» is not temporal or cultural, as in Smith, but disciplinary: «[f]or the documentary editor, it is not the text but the document itself which is of the greatest value. [...] While the textual editor values the art of constructing the text, he or she assumes that the text is greater than the evidence. For the documentary editor, connoisseurship of documents is valuable, the art is in the evidence [...]. I think a categorical description of the schools of "textual" and "documentary" editing, and editorial decisions which one makes upon principles emerging from one's philosophical stance in relation to the problem of VALUE, is of greater use than the terms "Literary" and "Historical"» (pp. 42-3). This invocation of *value* was answered by Fredson Bowers in a companion essay, «The Editor and the Question of Value: Another View», *TEXT*, 1 (1984), pp. 45-73, in which

There are several ways that we can address this problem (some of them presented in *Theories*). One escape from the historical paradox is simply to recognise that, yes, the «times, they are [always] a-changing» but to enlarge Bob Dylan's prescription that «The slow one now / Will later be past / As the present now / Will later be past / The order is / Rapidly fadin' / And the first one now / Will later be last» beyond its teleological or «progressive» mode ( $x$  leads to  $y$  which leads to  $z$ ) into a cultural complex where there is no single narrative (Marxist, Hegelian, Christian, Whiggish) of beginnings, middles, and ends, but a series of often unseen mini «revolutions» whose epistemological significance can perhaps be observed only *after* the *total* «revolution» has taken place. An example I use in *Theories* is Fernand Braudel's account of how he came to *make* his book on the Mediterranean<sup>12</sup> (*Theories*, p. 117). He notes that in 1928, his «original» intention for the book was for it to be a «classic and certainly more prudent form» (Braudel, p. 19) of diplomatic history, with Philip II as its inevitable central figure. This sort of account was «strongly approved» by other, more senior, historians, but, during the actual process of research, Braudel realized that «these statesmen were, despite their illusions, more acted on than actors» and that he would thus have to «move outside the traditional bounds of diplomatic history» (p. 19). What this move meant to Braudel was he would «dissect history into various planes, or, to put it another way, to divide historical time into geographical time, social time, and individual time. Or, alternatively, to divide man into a multitude of selves» (p. 21). Taking a position against the dominance of Ranke and Brandi, Braudel thus concludes that «the [traditional] historical narrative is not a method, or even the objective method *par excellence*, but quite simply a philosophy of history like any other» (p. 21). I summarise by saying that «“history” thus becomes “story”» (*Theories*, p. 117) and go on to show the practical implications of Braudel's shift in scholarly perspective: that «“Philip II” functions in Braudel's title [and in his work] only as an enabling mechanism: the book is not «about» Philip II, his wars, or his religious policies

he maintains that Badaracco's arguments «are philosophical and deductively based, not practically and inductively as has always been the guiding principle of textual criticism. There also seems to be an appeal to aesthetic considerations which have ordinarily been excluded from discussions of textual-critical theory» (p. 45). Bowers's demurrals doubtless reflected the intellectual position of the early 1980s, but a lot has happened since then, and the issue of the relation between the *value* of the «philosophical» and the «practical» lies at the heart of Eggert's critique of *Theories* and of this current essay.

<sup>12</sup> Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, Paris, A. Colin, 1949, trad. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. Siân Reynolds, New York, Harper & Row, 1972.

but has virtually the opposite hierarchical construction: it describes how the “Age” of “Philip II” is constructed out of the matrix of individual and multitudinous human agencies, or even *lack* of chartable human agencies, constructed at a level «invisible» to the great-figure historian» (*Theories*, p. 117). I would therefore offer this account of Braudel’s methodological and «theoretical» shift from the «great-figure» to the *annalistes* view of history as a corrective (or at least a demurral) to Eggert’s claim that while my marshalling of scholars like Braudel, Foucault, McGann, Kristeller, Hankins, and Chartier into «camps» (Eggert, p. 83) «retrieves a clarity out of the desperate over-production of literary-theoretical books and articles of recent years» (p. 83), that «[r]elevance to the practical and workaday empirical level is not always obvious, and in this volume the two [abstract and practical] are not serving to correct or qualify one another» (p. 83). Braudel’s exposing of himself as an historian moving from one methodological world-view to another is not just a personal narrative but also explains why the resultant book is, in very «practical» terms, very different in substance and argument from the one he had originally intended.

As I very briefly touch on in *Theories*, this shift reminds me of Tolstoy’s final chapter of *War and Peace*<sup>13</sup>, in which, after dealing with the figure of Napoleon *as if* he were a «great figure», he challenges this very assumption: «before talking about Napoleons, and Louis’, *and great writers*, [emphasis added] we must show the connection existing between those persons and the movement of nations [...]. So long as histories are written of individual persons – whether they are Cæsars and Alexanders, or Luthers and Voltaires – and not the history of *all*, without one exception, *all* the people taking part in an event, there is no possibility of describing the movement of humanity without a conception of a force impelling men to direct their activity to one end. And the only conception of this kind familiar to historians is power» [emphases in original] (Tolstoy, pp. 1348, 1353). This placing of power at the centre of historical movements sounds like Foucault *avant la lettre* (though Tolstoy’s later analysis somewhat undermines this centrality), but the important point, for Tolstoy and for Braudel, is that the decision to adopt a specific perspective on, say, power, does have an enormous effect on the historian’s ability to «find the component forces that make up the composite or resultant force» [so that] «it is essential that the sum of the component parts should equal the resultant» (p. 1349).

<sup>13</sup> Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, trans. Constance Garnett, New York, Modern Library, 1994.

My point is that «composite or resultant force» in Braudel's finished version of *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* is very different from that he had intended as he began work on the book, and that what was *unthinkable* in 1928 became *thinkable* several decades later. The shift in method, in theory, in philosophy, had enormous implications for the practical production of the book.

An example of this theoretical and methodological shift having produced a different sort of work – but this time on an even larger scale than Braudel's *Mediterranean* – is the focus, style, taxonomy, and even the subject matter of the new *Oxford English Literary History* as against the 'old' *Oxford History of English Literature*, both 'monumental' multi-volume series by many hands and both representing the intellectual and social milieu in which they were produced. Again, the «theory» of «literature» (and of «history») manifested itself in two very different «practices». As Jonathan Bate lucidly explains in his review of *OHEL* versus *OELH*<sup>14</sup>, even the term «literature» shifts its form and function: in *OHEL* «English Literature» is the broad subject of which the series is a cumulative history, but in *OELH* «literature» loses this dominant position to be replaced by «literary history». Bate provides a very clear account of how these differences affect the structure and content of the series:

The aim of *OHEL* was to provide summary accounts of as many writers as possible. Virtually forgotten authors were given their page, major ones their chapter, few individual works more than a handful of pages. In most volumes, the historical and social context remained wholly in the background. The new *OELH*, by contrast, has not been conceived as a comprehensive survey of the works of all «major» and «minor» authors of the past thousand years [...] The primary aim of the new series is to explore the diverse purposes of literary activity and the varied mental worlds of writers *and readers* [emphasis added] in the past. Particular attention is given to the institutions in which literary acts take place (educated communities, publishing networks and so forth), the forms in which literary works are presented (traditions, genres, structural conventions), and the relationship between literature and broader historical continuities and transformations. Literary history is distinct from political history, but a historical understanding of literature cannot be divorced from cultural and intellectual revolutions or the effects of social change and the upheaval of war (p. 17)<sup>15</sup>.

<sup>14</sup> Jonathan Bate, «A Monumental Task», *The Times Literary Supplement*, October 4, No. 5192 (2002), pp. 16-7.

<sup>15</sup> Note that Bate's critique of *OHEL* and *OELH* also emphasises the *literary* over *literature* («literary activity», «literary acts», «literary works», «[l]iterary history») and that even

In my view, Bate quite correctly explains this difference by noting that J. I. M. Stewart's volume in *OHEL* appeared as *Eight Modern Writers*<sup>16</sup>, and that «Stewart's emphasis on the close reading of a select "great tradition", and his complete neglect of the social circumstances of literary production were products of the 1940s and 1950s, the heyday of the "new criticism"» (pp. 16-7). Stewart's volume was never regarded as one of the stronger contributions to *OHEL* (perhaps by the time it appeared, in 1963, the critical climate had already begun to shift), but even the more highly regarded volumes (for example, Douglas Bush on the earlier seventeenth century<sup>17</sup>), despite what Bate characterises as «lucid, well-judged literary analysis» provided «little attention to effects on literature of the political cataclysms of the Cromwellian era» (p. 16).

Bate does not find anything surprising in these differences, nor do I find anything surprising in his ability to «see» them in these terms, for in 2002 he was writing in a period that had seen the supersession of new criticism by new historicism, of which the two series are emblematic. So, yes, critical and theoretical shifts or hegemonies do produce 'practical' effects depending in large part on their moment of production. But I would resist the temptation to see these shifts as predictable, together forming a history of history. Bate provocatively cites the example of Madame de Staël's 1800 *Literature considered in its relation to Social Institutions* as somehow a precursor to new historicism, with a «direct line of descent» (p. 16). Would that it were that simple, and that Stephen Greenblatt<sup>18</sup>, Louis Montrose<sup>19</sup>,

when *literature* does appear it is qualified or hedged in by the social or historical: «literature and broader historical continuities», «literature cannot be divorced from cultural and intellectual revolutions».

<sup>16</sup> J. I. M. Stewart, *Eight Modern Writers*, Oxford History of English Literature, vol. 12, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 1963.

<sup>17</sup> Douglas Bush, *English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century 1600-1660*, Oxford History of English Literature, vol. 5, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press, 1962.

<sup>18</sup> Stephen Greenblatt, *Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture*, New York, Routledge, 1991; *Renaissance Self-Fashioning From More to Shakespeare*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1980; *Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988. Greenblatt's later work, particularly the very popular *Will in the World: How Shakespeare Became Shakespeare*, New York, Norton, 2005, has moved away from the social matrix of new historicism toward great figure biography, albeit of a very idiosyncratic and speculative kind, and still embedded in a social matrix.

<sup>19</sup> Louis Montrose, «Celebration and Insinuation: Sir Philip Sidney and the Motives of Elizabethan Courtship», *Renaissance Drama*, 8 (1977), pp. 3-35; «"Eliza, Queene of shepherdes", and the Pastoral of Power», *English Literary Renaissance*, 10 (1980), pp. 153-82; «New Historicisms», in *Redrawing the Boundaries: The Transformation of English and*

Arthur Marotti<sup>20</sup>, Margreta de Grazia<sup>21</sup> and other new historicists<sup>22</sup> had somehow leapt over the intervening 170 years or so to attach themselves to de Stäel, without the more proximate interventions of Marc Bloch, who founded the *École des annales* in 1929<sup>23</sup>, Le Roy Ladurie<sup>24</sup>, and especially Lucien Febvre and Henri-Jean Martin's *L'Apparition du livre*<sup>25</sup>, Roger Chartier<sup>26</sup>, Michel Foucault<sup>27</sup>, and *Histoire de l'édition française*<sup>28</sup>.

*American Literary Studies*, ed. by Stephen Greenblatt, Giles Gunn, New York, MLA, 1992; «Professing the Renaissance: The Poetics and Politics of Culture», in *The New Historicism*, ed. by Harold Aram Veaser, London, Routledge, 1989.

<sup>20</sup> Arthur Marotti, «Malleable and Fixed Texts: Manuscript and Printed Miscellanies and the Transmission of Lyric Poetry in the English Renaissance»; «Manuscript, Print, and the English Renaissance Lyric», both in *New Ways of Looking at Old Texts: Papers of the Renaissance English Text Society, 1985-1991*, ed. by W. Speed Hill, Binghamton, Renaissance English Text Society/Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1993.

<sup>21</sup> Margreta de Grazia, «Sanctioning Voice: Quotation Marks, the Abolition of Torture, and the Fifth Amendment», *Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal*, 10 (1992), pp. 546-66; *Shakespeare Verbatim: The Reproduction of Authenticity and the 1790 Apparatus*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991; «What Is a Work? What Is a Document?», in Speed Hill (ed.), *New Ways of Looking at Old Texts*, cit.

<sup>22</sup> See *Theories*, pp. 119-25 for an account of the textual results of such new historicist criticism.

<sup>23</sup> See Marc Bloch, co-founder (with Lucien Febvre) of *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* (1929), now called *Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations*. See also *The Historian's Craft*, trans. Peter Putnam, New York, Vintage, 1953. Bloch has been such a central figure in French culture that he even has a faculty of a university named after him: the faculty of arts at Strasbourg University: see <http://u2.u-strasbg.fr/ici/UMB/site/pageindex.php>.

<sup>24</sup> See Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error*, trans. Barbara Bray, New York, Braziller, 1978.

<sup>25</sup> Translated as *The Coming of the Book*, David Gerard, London, Verso, 1990.

<sup>26</sup> See, for example, *Cultural History: Between Practices and Representations*, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1988; *The Cultural Uses of Print in Early Modern France*, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987; *The Culture of Print: Power in Early Modern Europe*, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987; *The Order of Books: Readers, Authors, and Libraries in Europe between the Fourteenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1994; «Texts, Printings, Readings», in *The New Cultural History*, ed. by Lynn Hunt, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989.

<sup>27</sup> See esp. Michel Foucault, *L'archéologie du savoir*, Paris, Gallimard, 1969, tr. *The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith, New York, Pantheon, 1972; *Les mots et les choses: une archéologie des sciences humaines*, Paris, Gallimard, 1966, tr. *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, New York, Vintage, 1973; *Power/Knowledge*, ed. by Colin Gordon, New York, Pantheon, 1980; «What Is an Author?», «Nietzsche, Genealogy, History», in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. by Paul Rabinow, New York, Pantheon, 1984.

<sup>28</sup> Henri-Jean Martin, Roger Chartier, Jean-Pierre Vivet, *Histoire de l'édition française*,

If then, Eggert's charge that in *Theories* the relation between the «theoretical» and «the practical and workaday empirical level is not always obvious» (as quoted earlier, p. 83), then I will have to admit that, if this is so for such a sensitive and acute reader as Eggert, *Theories* has perhaps not entirely fulfilled its mandate. But I would offer one further demurral: in my negotiations with Oxford University Press, the question was raised about my title. Why could I not call the book *Theory* rather than *Theories* of the text? I explained that my aim was to deny any permanent or universal hegemony of one particularly theory (as had happened, I believe, during the «formalist/new critical» period of «copytext» or «eclectic» editing), but instead to emphasise that «Theory» (with a capital T, as if it were a proper noun) is not as singular or as specific as this «propriety» might suggest, with «Theory» being written about and taught as if it were a defined discipline rather than a shifting way of perceiving phenomena, literary or otherwise. The plurality of *Theories* would (I hoped) catch this slippage, elision (or even intellectual «fashion») better than the monologous *Theory*. And here I agree with Eggert that the «age of theory» (or «Theory») is over, if by that we mean the discrete identification of a discipline without a qualifying modifier: «literary», «historical», «phenomenological», «structuralist» and so on. But it is not that, having paid proper obeisance to this false god of «Theory» as a free-standing object of study, we can now return to the hands-on, practical, and, yes, «workaday» business of editing, blissfully and confidently «doing what comes naturally», without recognising that, just as changing fashions in competing theories will produce different practical effects, so all productions of the human imagination, literary or otherwise, are underwritten and promoted by a conceptual (or call it «philosophical» or «theoretical») series of assumptions that may not even be acknowledged at the moment of production.

Let me give what I believe to be a very telling anecdote from my own editorial experience (and one not covered in *Theories*). When I was asked to contribute to that «monumental» critical edition of Trevisa I mentioned earlier, the question of the *value* of a particular witness to the text was confirmed or denied by its relative closeness to a putative authorial original (or even an «archetype» directly descending from this authorial

Paris, Promodis, 1982-1986. See the especially insightful review of volume 2 of this series by Nina Musinsky, «Histoire de l'édition française, Tome II: Le Livre triomphant, 1660-1830», *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America*, 80 (1986), pp. 476-99. See *Theories*, pp. 98-111 for coverage of this «proximate intervention», and see pp. 109-11 *passim* for references to Foucault.

«fair copy» and representing the earliest recoverable stage in the transmission of the work). Whether this adjudication was conducted under Alexandrian principles of *analogy*, Pergamian principles of *anomaly*, or Lachmannian principles of stemmatics and textual genealogy<sup>29</sup>, the conceptual underpinning for the technical process remained unchallenged, indeed taken for granted. In collating scribally corrupt copies of Homer against one another, the Alexandrian librarians hoped to recover an authentic «Homeric» reading perhaps unattested in any of the extant witnesses, and so on. Even though the Trevisa editorial team had been denied access to the muniments room of Berkeley Castle in Gloucestershire, where Trevisa completed his work and where one might reasonably suppose an authorial fair copy might reside, we were confident enough that, through stemmatic mapping and critical collation, we could come close to what might have been contained in that putative fair copy. In doing so, we might even characterise the status of witnesses as a whole, finding them to be «sincere» or «defective» or «authentic» and so on<sup>30</sup>.

Looking back on that confidence of thirty years ago, I can now see that the historical irony (at least for me) is that the one witness (MS C Cambridge University Library MS. li.v.41) we had banished into uttermost darkness because it had clearly been made for personal (and idiosyncratic) use – with rewritings of the text, deletions and additions, in a sloppy, almost amateur hand on paper not parchment<sup>31</sup> – could clearly not be used with any certainty for the establishment of the missing fair copy, and its variants were generally thus accorded a lesser *value* than

<sup>29</sup> See *Theories*, pp. 50-1 on analogy and anomaly, and 67-8 on Lachmann's stemmatics. See also Paul Oskar Kristeller, «The Lachmann Method: Merits and Limitations», *TEXT*, 1 (1984), pp. 11-20, and E. Castaldi *et al.*, *Ecdotica*, 1 (2004), pp. 55-81.

<sup>30</sup> These moral or ethical attributes for manuscripts are, of course, carried over to the print period, where a Shakespeare quarto may be characterised as «good» or «bad», depending on its supposed degree of representation of a (usually singular) authorial intention.

<sup>31</sup> Examples of these idiosyncratic (and unique) readings in C include *and* (for *an*) 732: 13; *about pe same ryuer* (for *about the Ryne*) 733: 2; *pinges* (for *prouynces*) 735: 10; *lyna* marked for deletion *langage* (for *langage*) 738: 14; *is pe* (for *pe*) 740: 8; *of* (for *on case for*) 741: 11; *forow* (for *foore*) 741: 32; *and it is a blessid* (for *beste*) 742: 17; *whiche he delide* (for *he deled it*) 745: 4; *wymmen* (for *wonen*) 745: 23; *it hap an* (for *with*) 747: 13; *Ysidere* (for *me*) 748: 9; *pat* (for *he be*) 749: 4; *seyn* (for *menen*) 749: 18 and so on. Note that these unique readings are recorded in the print apparatus only when there is an emendation to the copytext, MS BL MS. Additional 27944; the actual incidence and range of C's determined variations (which clearly encompass both major substantive changes and idiosyncratic rephrasings that do not change the basic meaning of the text) are in fact much greater than those noted in the print edition.

those of other witnesses, higher up in the family tree<sup>32</sup>. In the current ideological/theoretical climate of the early twenty-first century, it would now ironically be this «personal» manuscript that would be of particular interest, since it would show the text in social circulation, in cultural adjudication and individual use. It is a *socialized* witness and thus «bad» (during the hegemony of new critical textuality) but now «good» (during a period of culture criticism and book history). Obviously, I am not about to re-edit the massive Trevisa text according to this shift, any more than Jerome McGann, as he has often declared, is going to re-edit his «monumental» Byron edition<sup>33</sup>, although the conceptual universe in which it was produced is now one that he has since abandoned.

So just as Herrstein Smith can recognise contingency (but fail to acknowledge that this recognition is itself contingent), and just as Braudel (and the editors of those «great writers» of whom Tolstoy speaks and the authors of *OHÉL* and *OELH*) will produce very different works depending upon the (perhaps barely perceived) social and cultural «force» in place, and just as my «new» Trevisa would be very different from the one already published, so in all these cases what I have called the «manifestation» of textual theory will have varying practical (and «workaday») results. The practical is the theoretical.

Such a relation is evident even at the «popular» level of some instructional manuals. For example, in Michael Miller's *The Complete Idiot's Guide to Music Theory* (New York, Alpha, 2005), he claims that «we'll use the word "theory" to mean a study of the rudiments of music – the basic things that performers and listeners need to know to produce and enjoy this marvelous art. This goes back to the root meaning of the word, which means "a way of looking" (4)»<sup>34</sup>. Now, it might be

<sup>32</sup> In the edition, this C manuscript is placed in a very ambiguous position on the stemma, horizontal to, but not directly derived from, a putative non-extant witness (p. xiv).

<sup>33</sup> *Lord Byron: The Complete Poetical Works*, ed. by Jerome J. McGann, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980-1992.

<sup>34</sup> The *Oxford English Dictionary* (second edition, version 3.0, 2002) confirms Miller's view that *theory* originally meant (1) «A sight, a spectacle» (from 1605), or a (2) «mental view, contemplation» (from 1598-1611), but that these «root» meanings have been superseded by, for example, (3) «a conception or mental scheme of something to be done, or the method of doing it; a systematic statement of rules or principles to be followed» (from 1597), or (4a) «A scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a group of facts or phenomena; a hypothesis that has been confirmed or established by observation or experiment, and is propounded or accepted as accounting for the known facts; a statement of what are held to be the general laws, principles, or

objected that «music theory» is of a different order from other types of «theory», especially if it addresses the «rudiments» of a discipline rather than its practice. And, while the *OED* citations for «theory» bear out Miller's usage, it is clear that the division between, say, musicology (theory) and performance (practice) is more evident, even institutionally<sup>35</sup>, than in other disciplines. But maybe not. As, say, the arguments over the «original instruments» movement demonstrate, a shift in musicological theory will produce very different performance practices, over which there has been considerable contention<sup>36</sup>. When even Wagner, usually regarded as the epitome of modern performance practice, can be subjected to, or heard through, an «original instruments» theory<sup>37</sup>, to produce sometimes startlingly different results, then musicology/music history and practical performance may be more intertwined than this institutional separation might suggest. And, on the other hand, I do not believe that it is too fanciful to regard editions as «performances» of a particular conceptual assumption<sup>38</sup>, so that «music theory» and «music

causes of something known or observed» (from 1638). We get into our current difficulties only in meaning (4b) «That department of an art or technical subject which consists in the knowledge or statement of the facts on which it depends, or its principles or methods, as distinguished from the *practice* of it» [emphasis in original] (from 1613), though even this dichotomy seems to gain traction only in the nineteenth century, and (ironically?) in music: «1884 *GROVE Dict. Mus.* IV. 101/1 *Theory*, a term often used... to express the knowledge of Harmony, Counter-Point, Thorough-bass etc., as distinguished from the art of playing, which is... called "Practice"».

<sup>35</sup> In my own institution, the City University of New York Graduate Center, we have two separate doctoral programs for theory (a Ph.D. in Music) and practice (a DMA, or doctorate in musical arts).

<sup>36</sup> See, for example, Charles Rosen, «The Shock of the Old», *New York Review of Books*, 19 July, 1990, pp. 46-52 and *Authenticity and Early Music: A Symposium*, ed. by Nicholas Kenyon, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988. For a more balanced summary of the current state of the original instruments movement, see Michael White, «Period Music Grows Up. Period», *The New York Times*, August 6, 2006, Section 2, pp. 1, 20.

<sup>37</sup> Wagner, *Orchestral Works*, The London Classical Players, cond. Roger Norrington, London, EMI, 1995.

<sup>38</sup> A striking example would be the *Oxford Shakespeare*, which, in its first edition, presented two versions of *King Lear* because the editors accepted the «revisionist» rather than the «unitary» or «conflational» view of Shakespearean composition. For the position of the *Oxford Shakespeare* in current new-historical critical debate, see *Theories*, pp. 120-2 and see Margreta de Grazia, «What Is a Work? What Is a Document?» in Speed Hill (ed.), *New Ways of Looking at Old Texts*, cit. For a recent negative response to the continued «bitextualism» of the second edition of the *Oxford Shakespeare*, see the review by the arch-conservative Brian Vickers («By Other Hands», *The Times Literary Supplement*, 5393, August 11, 2006, pp. 10-2), in which he claims that there has been another swing back against «bitextualism»: «the growing consensus among Shakespeare editors, including at

performance» may have analogies in literature, architecture, painting, dance, and so on.

But if *theory* is indeed just a «way of looking» and if it also can be considered as the «rudiments» of a discipline, how do we account for Eggert's argument that we have now moved beyond an «age» of theory? I would respond to this charge that it is only in the «free-standing» definition of Theory (with that capital 'T') that we might be seen to have moved away from *Theory* (but not, I would caution, beyond *theories*). Some time ago, Gerald Graff cited James Kincaid's view that the profession of literature might have to «smuggle» theory into the classroom: «Wouldn't it show that these [competing] assumptions are not themselves innocent, that they were value-laden, interested, ideological? You are starting to suspect that this is a course in theory. And so it is. But all courses are courses in theory. One either smuggles it in or goes through customs with it openly [...] We need to teach not the texts themselves but how we situate ourselves in reference to those texts»<sup>39</sup>. Kincaid's prescription was used by Graff in support of his contention that we should attempt to «institutionalize the conflict of interpretations and overviews itself» and that «[t]he pedagogical implication of dialogics seems to be that the unit of study should cease to be the isolated text (or author) and become the virtual space or cultural conversation that the text presupposes»<sup>40</sup>. In another essay, Graff continues this argument with specific reference to textual study, acknowledging at first «the declining status of textual editing. [...] it seems symptomatic that an alliance with theory was needed to reverse the downward fortunes of editing. Of course, if editing has always had important theoretical implications, as the new editing theorists point out, then it does not seem unreasonable to expect these implications to become a central concern of the field»<sup>41</sup>. This suggestion of an «alliance» with theory is, of course, similar to Eggert's pro-

least seven who have edited *King Lear*, is that the variations between the two texts are not so great as to constitute two separate plays; that the alterations are theatrical, not authorial; and that the play loses more than it gains» (p. 12). Even given Vickers's conservative credentials, if he is even partly right about the change in «consensus», this provides yet further evidence for my basic argument that textual/philological «facts» are susceptible to changes in cultural context, in «ways of looking».

<sup>39</sup> James Kincaid, «The Challenge to Specialization: A Clarion Call or a Nostalgic Wheeze?» Unpublished essay, cited in Gerald Graff, *Professing Literature: An Institutional History*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987.

<sup>40</sup> Graff, *Professing Literature*, cit., pp. 258, 257.

<sup>41</sup> Gerald Graff, «Epilogue: The Scholar in Society», in *Introduction to Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures*, ed. by Joseph Gibaldi, New York, MLA, 1992.

motion of an alliance with history of the book. But since Graff made these arguments (in 1987 and 1992), I believe that the «smuggling» has been so successful that we no longer notice that we are dealing with smuggled goods. In fact, I have carried the argument further by suggesting that textual study can take advantage of its apparently «marginal» position vis-à-vis other disciplines by using that very marginality (and our tendency to co-opt and, if you like, «smuggle» parts of other disciplines into our own and then to make these co-opted ideas do *other* than they did in their «home» discipline), so that perhaps paradoxically textual study becomes by default and co-option not the «marginal» way of conceptualising and practising, but the *central* and (unseen) ideology<sup>42</sup>.

Our «ways of looking» (what Kincaid would call our «competing assumptions») are indeed diverse, and constantly changing, from the «old» new criticism and formalism of eclectic editing to socialised, gendered, phenomenological (and other as yet unnamed) *specula*. I do know that my graduate students may no longer produce formal «editions» as their responses to my doctoral course in textuality, but both *text* and *theories* are deeply embedded in their work<sup>43</sup>, perhaps in not immediately recog-

<sup>42</sup> These ideas on co-option (and textual imperialism) are developed in my «Contemporary Editorial Theory: From Modernism to Post-Modernism», in *Palimpsest: Editorial Theory in the Humanities*, ed. by George Bornstein, Ralph Williams, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1993, pp. 9-28.

<sup>43</sup> Such projects include a critical history (with transparency and conflated overlays) of the illustrations of the *Alice* books of Lewis Carroll (Emily Lauer), an electronic hypermedia archive of the «Literary Annuals» produced during the early nineteenth century (Katherine Harris, *Forget Me Not: A Hypertextual Archive of Ackermann's Nineteenth-Century Literary Annual. The Poetess Archive*, gen. Ed. Laura Mandell, at [www.orgs.muohio.edu/anthologies/FMN/](http://www.orgs.muohio.edu/anthologies/FMN/)), and *Forget Me Not! The Popular Phenomenon of Literary Annuals*, forthcoming Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), and *The Archive in Nineteenth Century Novels*, in preparation); Jeffrey Drouin's *Ecclesiastical Proust Archive: A Textual and Visual Resource*, a hypermedia archive of Proust's *À la recherche du temps perdu* (providing a «grid» – in the manner of Barthes's *S/Z* – with text and illustrations of all citations of churches in Proust, at <http://web.gc.cuny.edu/english/proustarchive/index.html>); Daniel Wuebben's recursive electronic «scrolling» lexical analysis of Borges' *Library of Babel*: «Borges' *Library of Babel*: An In-finitive Translation» at <http://ir.iit.edu/privserv/Babel/>, mimicking Borges' story of the infinitude of books by an infinitude of the components that make up the «text» of the *Library of Babel*; Christopher Schmidt's use of the «hovering annotation», in his electronic edition of «Ellen West» by Frank Bidart (at <http://www.christopher-schmidt.com/EllenWest/>), in which annotations appear and disappear as the cursor moves over the text, with the option (in the «Control Page Appearance» option), of presenting this material as hyperlinked footnotes or traditional numbered footnotes, with the further option of the reader's making his or her own notes (as in the user-constructed *Wikipedia* (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wi->

nisable forms. If this is so, as some recent work by «younger» textuists might suggest<sup>44</sup>, then, perhaps paradoxically, we might be entering a new phase of «doing what comes naturally», in which the plurality of «theories» and the multiple manifestations of «text» no longer need to be named or taxonomised because they have become internalised, in a sense emblems of Althusser's famous definition of a successful *ideology* as the «representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence»<sup>45</sup>.

And if this is so, it is true that *Theories of the Text* does indeed represent a passing phase of the history of textual criticism, as Eggert suggests, but not perhaps in exactly the way he believes. Shortly before the actual publication of *Theories*, I was invited by Raimonda Modiano to lead a series of guest lectures in the newly established graduate program in textual studies at the University of Washington in Seattle, an institution that has recently graduated its first students and one that regularly maintains a session at the biennial conferences of the Society for Textual Scholar-

ki/Main\_Page); for a popular history and analysis of this user-constructed hyperdatabase, see Stacy Schiff, «Know It All: Can *Wikipedia* Conquer Expertise?» *The New Yorker*, July 31, 2006, pp. 36-43). Other non-electronic, but equally provocative projects have included Maggie Nelson's «book-production» (in a «print-run» of two copies only, one for her and one for me) of Sylvia Plath's original intentions of the *Ariel* poems based on the archive at Smith College, several years before the Hughes estate finally allowed the «publication» of the poems as Plath had intended them.

<sup>44</sup> I would cite in particular the work of Matthew Kirschenbaum, including «Editing the Interface: Textual Studies and First Generation Electronic Objects», *TEXT*, 14 (2002), pp. 15-51; «The Word as Image in an Age of Digital Reproduction», in *Eloquent Images: Word and Image in the Age of New Media*, ed. by Mary E. Hocks, Michelle R. Kendrick, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, 2003, pp. 137-56; and *Mechanisms: New Media and Forensic Textuality*, forthcoming Cambridge, MIT Press. Kirschenbaum's work demonstrates how a critical intelligence brought to bear on «textual» issues combines both a conceptual sophistication and a practical expertise, but does not necessarily concentrate on producing «editions» of work. See also the recent «non-editorial» but decidedly «textual» work of Kym McCauley, including *Collision/Collusion. Editing-Rhizomes-Hypertext* (Ph.D. diss. University College, University of New South Wales, 1999, at kym.mccauley@gmail.com «Genealogy, History and Hypermedia Authorship» (*The Electronic Journal of Australian and New Zealand History*, at <http://www.jcu.edu.au/aff/history/conferences/virtual/mccauley.htm>); «Rhizomes Just Don't Grow on Trees! Studying Bibliography in the 1990s», *Bibliographical Society of Australia and New Zealand Bulletin*, 22, 1 (1998), pp. 27-38; «Hypertext and the Legacy of Textual Criticism», *LASIE: Library Automated Systems Information Exchange*, 30, 1 (1999), pp. 42-50.

<sup>45</sup> Louis Althusser, «Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)», in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1971. See *Theories*, pp. 368-9.

ship. I had made advance proofs of the book available to the students, and one of the most searching questions I was asked was whether I would do the book the same way now (and that was in 1999). I responded that I already felt that the book was too taxonomised, too neatly divided into those heavy chapters on history, gender, structure, and so on, and that having been through the exercise of a «naming of parts», it was now time to move beyond the parts to the whole, without those neat divisions. This was not to suggest that we did not need some sort of book like *Theories* – a way of organising our «ways of looking», and a way of alerting us to the various conceptual or philosophical underpinnings of our work as textuists – but that I might now hope that with this ingesting of multiple «perspectives» we could use these perspectives in the sort of fruitful (and yes, practical) work that my own graduate students were producing. They were (are) not editors nor even textual critics *per se*, but they could embed textuality into the critical and scholarly projects they were pursuing.

So I do not look for a great «age of editing» (as the 1950s to 1980s has frequently been described), with the production of institutionally (and sometimes governmentally) sponsored multi-volume print critical editions of the major authors of our several national patrimonies. Nor do I look for a «comprehensive» or «structural» attempt to lay out the various philosophical or perceptual divisions of textual theory as in *Theories*. In fact, some provocative textuists, notably Randall McLeod<sup>46</sup>, have in any case been arguing for many years that «editing» is inimical to, and often destructive of, historical research and understanding, while others have used textuality in the production of some very probing critical arguments without ever feeling the need to produce an «edition»<sup>47</sup>. I can certainly understand that, with much invested in these various national editorial projects, among which is Eggert's own fine series of Academy Editions of Australian Literature<sup>48</sup>, this move from editorial to the text-

<sup>46</sup> See Randall McLeod, «From «Tranceformations in the Text of *Orlando Furios*», *New Directions in Textual Studies*, ed. by Dave Oliphant, Robin Bradford, Austin, Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center-University of Texas Press, 1990; and (as Random Cloud), «Information on Information», *TEXT*, 5 (1991). See also Derek Pearsall, «Editing Medieval Texts: Some Developments and Some Problems», in McGann (ed.), *Textual Criticism and Literary Interpretation*, for an attack on «critical» editions, together with Jerome J. McGann, «What Is Critical Editing?» *TEXT*, 5 (1991), repr. in McGann, *The Textual Condition*, cit.

<sup>47</sup> See, for example, Joseph Grigely, *Textuality: Art, Theory and Textual Criticism*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995.

<sup>48</sup> Produced under the auspices of the Australian Scholarly Editions Centre. For Eg-

critical does have some inertial resistance, perhaps especially when such series seek to establish or resuscitate an alternative canon of subaltern texts. But even the shift in usage between «edition» and «archive» (particularly in electronic representations of text<sup>49</sup>), with all of the inevitable Foucauldian associations of that term, shows that our current «naming of parts» is in flux.

I have already argued that this nominal displacement of «edition» by «archive» in electronic texts is an attempt by those who have distanced themselves from «critical editions» to co-opt (mistakenly, I believe) the apparently neutral, objective, aura of *archive* rather than the invasive, proscriptive, connotations of *edition* (and of the often negative inferences in the verb «to edit»), in the sense of «to garble, “cook” (e.g. a war-correspondent’s dispatch, etc.)», *OED* «edit» (2b)<sup>50</sup>. I have also argued that this slippage from *edition* to *archive* (and from print to hypertext) may involve some redefining of the «editorial» role but will not fundamentally change the critical responsibilities: «the dual change in technology and the theory of reading will gradually construct a different view of the editor, as a sort of new historicist archivist of text, a culture critic who becomes the provisioner for the phenomenological voyage of perception to be undertaken by the many and sundry travellers in text» (*Theories*, p. 244). But it should be understood that this «provisioning» (down to the mundane and practical decisions about hyperlinks and so on) is still a *critical*, a hermeneutic act of intervention and interpretation. I have previously cited Kathryn Sutherland’s acute recognition of this interventionist role: «[U]nlike the edition... the archive denies any provisional or mediated status. It denies

gert’s introduction to the series, see <http://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/ASEC/Foreword.html>. Eggert is both Director of this Centre (which also produces the Colonial Texts series) and General Editor of the Academy editions.

<sup>49</sup> See for example, Jerome J. McGann’s *The Complete Writings and Pictures of Dante Gabriel Rossetti: A Hypermedia Archive*, at <http://www.rossettiarchive.org/>. See also George Landow’s *Dickens Web*, at <http://www.eastgate.com/catalog/Dickens.html>; Peter Robinson’s electronic Chaucer (e.g., «The General Prologue», ed. by Elizabeth Solopova, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, CD-ROM, 2000; *The Wife of Bath’s Prologue*, ed. Peter Robinson, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, CD-ROM, 1996; both available as LAN licenses; see also [http://afdtk.uaa.alaska.edu/ECT\\_manuscripts.htm](http://afdtk.uaa.alaska.edu/ECT_manuscripts.htm) for links to various forms of an electronic Chaucer; and the CD-ROM six-witness archive by Murray McGillivray of Chaucer’s *Book of the Duchess*, Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 1999. This is, of course, only a small selection of current and projected electronic archives.

<sup>50</sup> See also my commentary on the problematic «editorial» status of the *archive* in «Who’s In, Who’s Out: The Cultural Poetics of Archival Exclusion», in *The Poetics of the Archive*, ed. by Paul J. Voss, Marta L. Werner. Special Issue of *Studies in the Literary Imagination*, 32, 1 (2000), pp. 1-28.

individual agency in its assembly; it implies a neutral, unmediated storehouse of facts/data awaiting the reader or user who then her-/himself takes on the role of editor, choosing to define connections between documents in a variety of temporary ways»<sup>51</sup>. Sutherland goes on to dispute this claim for an «unmediated» status. In two companion essays («The Resistance to Philology» and «Contamination and/of “Resistance”»)<sup>52</sup> I have maintained that an open recognition and endorsement of the hermeneutics of textuality is the most effective means whereby we can place what we used to call «philology» at the centre not just of our own enterprise but of scholarly and critical work generally: «[b]y acknowledging our textual and bibliographical research as contingent, local, and ephemeral – in other words, as “personalist criticism”, or local knowledge – ironically we may be able... to convince our colleagues and peers that what we produce really are books, not nonbooks or half-books» («Resistance», p. 20). My argument in that essay is that Paul de Man’s prescription for a «return to philology» (as what he calls «an examination of the structure of language prior to the meaning it produces»<sup>53</sup>) offers an invalid and unnecessarily narrow and non-interpretative role to the discipline of philology, as does Jonathan Culler’s call for an «antifoundational philology»<sup>54</sup> (where, in my view, philology is already «antifoundational»: see «Resistance», p. 10). «Literary criticism and interpretation, the relation of literature and written records to history, etc.; literary or classical scholarship; polite learning»: yes, this is our mandate as textuists (though I would also include «impolite» learning as well as «polite»).

These calls by critics for a «return» to philology or for «antifoundational» philology have in a sense already been met by medievalists in the

<sup>51</sup> Kathryn Sutherland, «Looking and Knowing: Textual Encounters of a Postponed Kind», in Chernaik, Deegan, Gibson (eds.), *Beyond the Book*, cit., pp. 11-22.

<sup>52</sup> *Margins of the Text*, ed. by David C. Greetham, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1997, pp. 9-24 and *Never Again Would Birds’ Song Be the Same: Essays on Early Modern and Modern Poetry in Honor of John Hollander*, ed. by Jennifer Lewin, New Haven, Yale University Press-Beinecke Library, pp. 189-205 respectively.

<sup>53</sup> Paul de Man, «The Return to Philology», in *The Resistance to Theory*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1986, p. 24. While my argument in «Resistance to Philology» is based more on disciplinary profiles and challenges rather than on historical usage, the *OED*’s citations for *philology* support this less restrictive sense, where the primary meaning (especially in the US) is given as «Love of learning and literature; the study of literature, in a wide sense, including grammar, literary criticism and interpretation, the relation of literature and written records to history, etc.; literary or classical scholarship; polite learning».

<sup>54</sup> Jonathan Culler, «Antifoundational Philology», in *On Philology*, ed. by Jan Ziolkowski, University Park, Pennsylvania University Press, 1990, p. 52.

special issue of *Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies*, Jan. 1990, pp. 1-108<sup>55</sup>, and are echoed in Luciano Formisano's «Gaston Paris e i «nouveaux philologues»<sup>56</sup>: what this present essay demonstrates is that «philology» needs to be continually reinvented, as «new» or otherwise. While I would accept the necessity of any branch of knowledge to re-examine periodically «the matrix out of which all else springs» (*philology* in Nichols's *Speculum* essay, p. 1), and while I would agree (again with Nichols) that «medieval philology has been marginalized by contemporary cognitive methodologies... while within the discipline itself, a very limited and by now grossly anachronistic conception of it remains far too current» (Nichols, p. 1), and would further agree with Lee Patterson's historical analysis that «the master narrative first put in place by the Renaissance is the cause of all our woe as medievalists» (p. 101) and that «medievalists became part of the conservative opposition that condemned literary study as, in the words of William Stubbs, «dilettante teaching»<sup>57</sup>, Patterson goes on to argue that what is needed is to «dismantle the barriers that divide medieval studies from the rest of the human sciences»

<sup>55</sup> For the purposes of this current essay, the most provocative and useful contributions are the introduction, «Philology in a Manuscript Culture», by Stephen G. Nichols, «Reflections on (New) Philology», by Siegfried Wenzel, «Philology, Linguistics, and the Discourse of the Medieval Text», by Suzanne Fleischman, and «On the Margins: Post-modernism, Ironic History, and Medieval Studies», by Lee Patterson.

<sup>56</sup> *Ecdotica*, 2 (2005), pp. 5-22. While Formisano's argument (and coverage) centres on Gaston Paris (and specifically the relations between *New Philology* and *New Medievalism*), and while he does emphasise the importance of the «conscience nationale» (whereby «chaque philologie moderne ait son centre névralgique dans la nation dont elle s'occupe», pp. 6, 11), his historical analysis does have room for the interrogation – and rejection – of the «auteur transcendant» together with «une théorie autoritaire littéraire» of Bernard Cerquiglini (*Éloge de la variante: Histoire critique de la Philologie*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1989, p. 90, qtd. Formisano, p. 8). I similarly use Cerquiglini as a critic of the «great (and singular) author» in my essay on Eriugena, where I cover a similar reconceptualising of editorial and philological methodology as Formisano. (See Greetham, «Édouard Jeaneau's Edition of Eriugena's *Periphyseon* in the Light of Contemporary Textual Theory», Special Issue on Eriugena of *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 79.4 Fall 2005, ed. Phillipp W. Roseman, pp. 527-48.)

<sup>57</sup> Patterson here cites D. J. Palmer, *The Rise of English Studies*, London, 1965, pp. 71, 99, Graff's *Professing Literature*, cit., sets this battle over the value and nature of medieval study within the broader issues of literature having to defend (and define) itself as deliberately «difficult» (and hence «philological» in the old sense) to avoid being labelled as «mere chatter about Shelley», i.e., that «English should be studied as Greek is», Graff, p. 36. See also Alvin Kernan, *The Death of Literature*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990, where this «mere chatter» is addressed as part of his coverage of «the university asked to define literature» (chapter 2).

(p. 104), citing as examples the «specific and pressing political commitments» (p. 107) of such «old» philologists as Erich Auerbach<sup>58</sup>, Leo Spitzer, and Ernst Robert Curtius. Patterson's agenda for a part of this dismantling is a recognition that «postmodernism [is] a genuine postmodernist return to history. On this account, precisely the recognition that the natural, universal, given, transcendent, and timeless is historically constituted – and therefore alterable – is the great liberating insight of postmodernism» (p. 90).

Given the slow institutional processing of disciplinary shifts, it is perhaps too early to say whether *Speculum's* call for a «new» philology has yet been marked by changes in disciplinary production and training. In fact, with Oxford University's having dropped its Old English requirement in English (and with my own institution having similarly dropped its requirement in history of the language, which was typically taught by medievalists), one might argue that the rift between medievalists and the rest of the academy has grown wider. But the basic points made by Nicholls and Patterson – that philology is (like «theory») the «matrix» for medieval study and yet that postmodernism, with its rejection of the *grand récit*, promotes an awareness of the fully «historicized» text – can, I believe, serve as the model for textuality and textual study as well, as long as we recognise that we need both the «old» philology of close textual and linguistic study and the «new» philology of hermeneutics and historicism (in fact, the «old» definition of *philology* before its compass was narrowed to primarily linguistic matters). We are back with the *OED's* «the study of literature, in a wide sense, including grammar, literary criticism and interpretation, the relation of literature and written records to history».

Thus, the «philology redux» of my title is not just a play on words but a call to arms. While I do believe that there is more of the «relevance to the practical and workaday empirical level» in *Theories* than Eggert is willing to concede, there is no doubt that the book's very structure emphasises the conceptual taxonomies of textuality rather than a manual of practice. In this respect, it can perhaps best be considered as the anti-type to my *Textual Scholarship: An Introduction*<sup>59</sup>. Recognising that *Theories* is also largely descriptive and historical rather than prescriptive and prophetic, I would have to agree with Eggert's characterisation of the

<sup>58</sup> For the status and influence of Auerbach as philologist see *Literary History and the Challenge of Philology: The Legacy of Eric Auerbach*, ed. by Seth Lehrer, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1996.

<sup>59</sup> *Textual Scholarship: An Introduction*, New York, Garland 1992, rev. 1994, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. in preparation, New York, Routledge.

limitations of the book: «we must move on. *How* to move on, is the question. Here he is less helpful» (p. 82).

In this response to an articulate and very perceptive analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of *Theories*, I can obviously not spell out a complete program for «how to move on». But taking my cue from Eggert's own title, «These post-philological days», and from his citing of my summary of the «dilemma» for philology (*Theories*, pp. 78-9, Eggert, p. 84), I can offer a more comprehensive and hermeneutical perspective and responsibility for *philology* and therefore to suggest that it is no longer that the «days» we live in are «post-philological» but that the «contamination» and «conflation» of theory and practice has meant that the even earlier, more «fundamental» role for philology can now be resuscitated. It is not so much that we need to move beyond philology as that we need to recognise that the interweaving of theory and practice has proffered us a more vital, more interrogative, more «antifoundational» view of philology, of which we can now take advantage. Philology [semper?] redux.